Omaha Beach was the responsibility of the US V Corps. Major General Clarence Huebner's 1st Division would land with two regiments abreast, the 116th infantry (from the 29th division) on the right and the 16th Infantry on the left. Once the beach was secured, these regiments would be supported by two other regiments and the attackers would then seize the Bayeux Road to the south and perhaps reach Isigny to the west.
The gently sloping sand of Omaha Beach led to coarse shingle and immediately behind rose high sandy bluffs. There were only 5 exits through the bluffs and these valleys were protected by concrete bunkers. Nowhere else were assaulting troops confronted with such serious obstacles. The area was defended by the overextended 716th Division (responsible for the coastline from the Orne to the west of Omaha), but at Omaha it had been reinforced by the higher-quality 352nd Division. This reinforcement was not detected by Allied intelligence. While the British had placed emphasis on getting specialist armored vehicles ashore at the very beginning to deal with obstacles, the American approach was less technological and beach clearing was to be done by unarmored engineer teams. Lastly, the long run-in through heavy seas caused losses before the attackers reached the shore, and the coastal current meant that most landing craft beached eastward of their intended landfall.
At 5:40am the first DD tanks were launched 6,000 yards out, but most foundered at once, and of the 32 launched only 5 reached the shore. The artillery expected to fire on the way in did a little better. All but one of the German 105mm guns were taken out as were 6 of the German 7th Field Battery Battalion's pieces. Although naval bombardment had temporarily neutralized the defenses, they came to life as the landing craft neared the shoreline. The nine companies of the first assaulting wave were disgorged, overloaded, soaking wet and often seasick onto the surf of a bullet-swept beach. Undamaged obstacles gave them a degree of cover but posed a terrible risk to incoming DUKWs and landing craft.
The failure of the first wave meant that the specialist engineer teams were unable to work as planned, despite suffering 40 percent casualties that day. After the first dreadful hour the 116th Infantry had a toehold just west of Les Moulins, and, as much by luck as by judgement, it was there that the regimental command group under Colonel Charles Canham and the assistand division commander Brigadier General Norman Cota , landed. The view form the sea was depressing. One officer reported that the beach was clogged with infantry while landing craft milled about like a stampeded herd of cattle. Lieutenant General Omar Bradley , the US First Army commander, aboard USS Augusta, even briefly considered redirecting the remaining units to Utah Beach.
By this time there was progress on the beach as destroyers came dangerously close inshore to engage defenses at point blank range, and determined groups of men fought their way off the beaches. Sometimes they were formal leaders, and sometimes they were not. By yhe days end the Americans held a narrow strip of land between St Laurent and Colleville, but they lacked most of the resources needed for the planned advance inland. Omaha Beach had cost V Corps around 3,000 casualties, more than were suffered on the other beaches in total.
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